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Abstract: This study aims to quantify the contribution of social networks, i.e., guanxi, 
to income inequality in rural households in China. One purpose is to understand how 
this influence varies across regions with different levels of marketization and economic 
development. Employing household survey data in rural China, we find that social 
networks contribute 12.1%–13.4% to income inequality among households in rural 
China, ranking fourth after village identifiers, nonfarm employment, and education. We 
also find that social networks exert a greater impact on income and a greater 
contribution to income inequality in Eastern China, compared with Middle–Western 
China where economic development is relatively slower. Our findings challenge the 
conventional understanding that social capital is the capital of the poor. In other words, 
the rich get richer in richer regions through social networks. 
Keywords:  Social Network, Income Inequality, Marketization, Regression-Based 
Decomposition 
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1.  Introduction 
Social networks play an important role in the organization of societal life, especially in 
guanxi in China; i.e., social networks.
1 Empirical studies have found guanxi in Chinese 
society can bring about economic well-being through reductions in poverty (Zhang et al., 2007) 
and higher income levels (Knight and Yueh, 2002), as well as facilitating the development of 
rural industry owing to the kinship network in rural China (Peng, 2004). This body of research, 
however, focuses on the benefits of an individual’s social network without taking into 
consideration the influence of the distribution of social networks upon income inequality. 
Thus, it gives rise to the question whether inequality in social networks among households 
influences income inequality among households, and to what extent. Further, does this impact 
vary with economic development and marketization? 
These questions are pertinent to the argument that “… social capital is the capital of the 
poor”, as social capital, particularly social networks, facilitate credit access and contribute 
significantly to the welfare of the poor (Grootaert, 1999, 2001). Nevertheless, this argument 
could be somewhat ill-formed if the rich benefit more from their social capital, if the 
distribution of social capital favors the rich, or if the rich in richer regions receive relatively 
more than their peers in less-developed regions. All of these possibilities could undermine the 
argument that social capital is indeed the capital of the poor. 
In an effort to clarify these questions, our paper studies the contribution of the inequality of 
social networks to income inequality in rural China using a newly developed method; namely, 
regression-based decomposition (Shorrocks, 1999). Our findings are as follows. First, social 
networks contribute some 12.1%–13.4% to total income inequality in our sample, following 
village identifiers, nonfarm employment, and education. This means that the rich benefit more 
 
 
1 In Chinese society, guanxi generally refers to one’s own social network. This concept is widely used in 
academia; see, for instance, Li and Zhang (2003).  
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from social networks than the poor. Second, the contribution of social networks to income 
inequality in the East of China is greater than that in Middle and Western regions of China 
where the level of development and marketization lags behind. These findings imply that 
social networks, the foremost category of social capital, are more likely to be the capital of the 
rich. Moreover, the second finding may also question Stiglitz’s (2000) argument that formal 
institutions, given the ongoing development of marketization, will increasingly displace the 
role of social capital as an informal institution. This cross-regional comparison likely predicts 
that social networks could play an even more significant role in the organization of societal life 
at more advanced stages of development. These findings then provide a better understanding 
of the nexus between social networks and marketization, as well as trends in and the 
transformation of the Chinese economy. 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the research 
literature with respect to social capital, income inequality, and the methods of analysis. 
Section 3 provides a description of the data and the variable selection. Section 4 undertakes an 
empirical study of household income determination and the regression results, followed by the 
regression-based decomposition of income inequality in Section 5. In Section 6, we group the 
data by geographical region and decompose the contribution of social networks to income 
inequality for each region. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
Since the late 1970s, with the implementation of the household responsibility system in 
rural areas of China, a multitude of income sources has arisen among villagers freed from 
collective agricultural production. It follows that the income inequality in rural areas has risen 
in the last 30 years. According to the World Bank,
2 the Gini coefficient in rural China 
increased by more than 60% from 1980 to 2005: from 0.25 in 1980 to 0.38 in 2005, almost at 
 
 
2 See the World Bank survey at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalSvy.html  
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the ‘warning line’ of inequality of 0.4. This increase in income inequality could jeopardize 
some aspects of economic development, including aggravating poverty (Wan and Zhang, 2006) 
and hamper income gains in rural households (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001). Hence, 
investigating the sources of the rising income inequality in rural China is not only significant 
but also imperative. 
Research into income inequality in rural China has been the subject of increasing attention 
in academia and the source of many important findings. Existing research mainly focuses on 
the sources and determination of income, including the role of physical, human, and political 
capital. For example, Xu et al. (2008) show that the disaggregation of collective lands in the 
late 1970s led to land inequalities, which in turn was responsible for the rising income 
inequality among rural households. Likewise, Wang (2006) suggests that education plays a 
significant role in income inequality in rural China. Meanwhile, there are an increasing 
number of studies concerning the role of political capital, mainly represented by party 
members and village/town cadres. Analyzing data on rural households in Shandong Province, 
Morduch and Sicular (2000, 2002) concluded that being a party member or cadre exerts a 
positive impact on income (Morduch and Sicular, 2000) and contributes to a certain level of 
income inequality (Morduch and Sicular, 2002). Walder (2002) reveals similar results. 
Nevertheless, there has been lack of concern about the contribution of social networks to 
income inequality, especially on the contribution of the kinship networks that are an 
indispensable part of Chinese daily life. 
The role of social capital, as initially proposed by Jane Jacobos (1961),
3 has increasingly 
drawn the attention of economists, sociologists, and political scientists. Although there is still 
some controversy about the exact definition of social capital, the seminal concept proposed by 
Putnam (1993) is that social capital refers to the collective value of all ‘social networks’ and 
 
 
3 Jacobos initially proposed the concept of social capital in her seminal text The Death and Life of Great 
American Cities, where she referred to the networks among the New Yorkers as an indispensable part of the 
flourishing of the city, although she did not explicitly define social network or social capital.  
 
5
the inclinations arising from these networks to ‘do things for each other’. Most recently, there 
is an emerging consensus about the definition of social capital advanced by the World Bank 
(2000) that social capital refers to “… norms and networks that enable collective actions”. One 
can think of social capital, particularly social networks, as an asset people boast about and 
invest in to assist each other. In turn, studies have linked social networks to improvements in 
income (Narayan and Pritchett, 1997), the facilitation of employment (Montgomery, 1991; 
Munshi, 2003, 2006), especially for the alleviation of poverty (Grootaert, 1999, 2001) and 
better access to credit through the role of informal insurance (Grootaert, 1999; Bastelaer, 
2000). 
Using quantile regression, Grootaert (1999, 2001) draws the conclusion that ‘social capital 
is the capital of the poor’ on the basis that the return to social capital for people at the 10
th 
percentile of income is higher than that at the 90
th percentile. This proposition, however, is 
perhaps rather too hasty in aggrandizing the positive effect of social capital for the poor, 
mainly because Grootaert focused on comparing the return to social capital between the top 
and the bottom percentiles without taking into consideration the distribution of networks 
between these groups, and did not consider income decomposition for further study. In 
Grootaert’s paper, the rich enjoy relatively more social capital: this suggests that social capital 
is more likely the capital of the rich. In an effort to address these puzzles, our paper focuses on 
social networks, the most vital measurable category of social capital at an individual level, to 
see whether social capital is indeed the capital of the poor. Moreover, the data used in the 
existing literature either is collected in developed countries (like the US) or in countries at 
very low levels of development (e.g., rural areas in Tanzania). However, China, a country 
experiencing breathtaking development and transformation with great disparity across 
different areas, can serve as an ideal research object for comparative study of the contributing 
factors to income inequality. This is because there is no need to be concerned about the 
availability and comparability of data in, say, an international comparative study.  
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The significance of guanxi or social networks is appreciable in the daily life of the Chinese 
people and thus attracts considerable interest from academia. Guanxi has been seen to promote 
employment, not only for migrants (Li and Zhang, 2003), but also urban residents (Bian, 
2001). Moreover, there is already some work concerning the influence of guanxi upon income 
inequality between groups. For instance, Lin (2001) considers the influence of social network 
inequality from the perspective of capital. Lin (2001) argues there are two channels through 
which social network inequality affects income inequality: capital deficits and return deficits. 
Capital deficits are the extent to which different social groups, for reasons of investment or 
opportunities, possess a different quality or quantity of capital, while return deficits are the 
extent to which a given quality or quantity of capital generates differential returns for different 
social groups. Using labor market data for urban China, Lin (2001) finds one reason for the 
higher income of male workers is not only that they have greater access to social capital than 
female workers, but even for the same quantity of social capital the return to social capital is 
higher among male workers. The most severe drawback of Lin’s (2001) method is that it is 
limited to a certain extent by the grouping of the sample. Lin (2001) also failed to check other 
sources or factors that may contribute to income inequality. 
In contrast with the static analysis of social networks, revealing how they influence social 
network changes in the process of development and marketization is a particularly exciting 
and challenging aspect of development economics. According to Stiglitz (2000), formal 
institutions will displace social capital, as an informal institution, during the development 
process. Several scholars have thus given attention to the role of traditional social networks in 
the process of development, transformation, and globalization. Munshi and Rosenzweig 
(2006), using survey data on school enrolment and income in Mumbai, found that the 
traditional caste-based social network channelled lower-caste boys into local language schools 
followed by traditional occupations, whereas lower-caste girls, who did not benefit from 
caste-based social networks, could exploit opportunities provided by globalization to switch to  
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English language schools. 
Through study of the labor market in urban China, Knight and Yueh (2002) and Li, Lu and 
Sato (2008) find that social networks not only can exert a positive influence on income, but 
that this influence is larger in private sector firms than in state-owned enterprises. Based on the 
premise that the private sector represents the trend in marketization and development, they 
draw the conclusion that social networks become even more significant with the 
transformation of the economy. Conversely, some studies have found that the social network 
function decreases with the development of formal institutions. Zhang et al. (2007) suggest 
that household level social networks have less effect on poverty reduction in areas with a high 
level of marketization. In addition, Lu et al. (2008) conclude that with the growing 
opportunities to work outside villages, social capital is losing its ability to cushion natural 
shocks for rural households in China. Following this literature, our paper attempts to discover 
how the influence of social networks on income inequality is evolving in response to the 
processes of marketization and economic development. 
In the empirical analysis of income distribution, there are three main approaches: 
semiparametric and nonparametric methods, decomposition by grouping, and decomposition 
by regression. The semiparametric or nonparametric techniques, first proposed by Deaton 
(1997) and Dinardo et al. (1996), attempt to analyze income inequality through the 
distribution of the income density function. These approaches, however, are less than 
persuasive because they lack restrictions on the model of income determination. The second 
method is to group data in accordance with the sample characteristics, such as education, 
gender, etc. As pointed out by Morduch and Sicular (2001), the drawbacks of this method lie 
in three key areas. First, this method cannot apply to continuous variables (such as age) that 
are often quite important and necessary in the analysis of income inequality. Second, there are 
limitations in the number of variables that can be included because the number of groups will 
multiply with the number of categories for each factor. Finally, it is impossible to control for  
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the endogeneity of the variable used to group data, presumably because the researcher groups 
data with an exogenous variable. 
Accordingly, the most popular method used in researching income inequality is the 
decomposition of inequality with regression. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) originally 
proposed this line of research to decompose between-group differences in the mean of income. 
In more recent times, Field and Yoo (2000) and Morduch and Sicular (2003) have greatly 
developed this line of analysis by developing their own methods of decomposition. However, 
there are several limitations in their work. First, they confine their regression models to only a 
few specific forms: Field and Yoo (2000) use a semilog model, while Morduch and Sicular 
(2003) assume a linear model. Second, these studies are also restricted in adopting a specific 
measure of income inequality. Finally, the contribution of the residual term to income 
inequality remains unexplained. However, the regression-based Shapley value decomposition 
proposed by Shorrocks (1999) addresses these limitations, later refined by Wan (2004), to 
tackle the contribution of the residual term.
4 
In sum, the main contributions of our paper are twofold. First, we quantify the contribution 
of social networks to income inequality using the regression-based decomposition method. 
Second, by utilizing the stunning disparity between the Eastern and Middle–Western regions 
in rural China, our paper examines how the contribution of social network to income 
inequality varies with different stages of economic development. 
 
3.  Description of the Data and Variables 
The main data source in our paper is the China Rural Survey 2004 conducted by the China 
Center for Economic Studies at Fudan University. The sample includes information on 927 
households in 48 villages across 22 provinces in 2003, comprising approximately 20 
 
 
4 For a review of income inequality analysis methods, especially income inequality decomposition, see Morduch 
and Sicular (2002) and Wan (2004).  
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households in each village and two villages in each province. The most striking advantage of 
this dataset is its rich information about social capital in rural China, particularly social 
networks. 
We group the data according to the level of marketization from the Report on China 
Marketization Index 2002 (Fan and Wang, 2004). This report builds an evaluation system for 
the relative level of marketization of provinces in China using several characteristics, 
including the relationship between government and the market, the development of the private 
sector, the development of the product and factor markets, and the development of formal 
institutions and the legal system. The relative marketization indices grade continuously from 
one to 10 so that the higher the index, the deeper the process of marketization. We use the 
marketization index from 2002 to avoid any potential simultaneity with the other variables. 
Figure 1 depicts the marketization level by province in China. It is clear that the development 
of markets in different regions is unbalanced, as shown by the variance in the level of 
marketization. The numbers in parenthesis for each province show (from left to right) the 
respective number of villages, the number of households, and the level of marketization. 
 
[Figure 1: Here] 
 
Table 1 lists the variables and their definitions. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of household income per capita from summing “income from land, forest, stock, 
fruit, and fishing”, “income from nonagricultural occupation in local areas”, “income from 
employment outside county”, and “income from property”. The independent variables are 
categorized into family characteristics, household physical capital, human capital, political 
capital and village dummy variables, all of which are generally found in existing research (e.g., 
Morduch and Sicular, 1999, 2002; Walder, 2002; Wan, 2004; Wan et al., 2006). More 
importantly, as social networks are the focus of our paper, we explain its measurement as  
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follows. 
 
[Table 1: Here] 
 
Because the most vital social network formations in China are the kinship network and the 
close friendship relationship (Knight and Yueh, 2002), we mainly focus on two social network 
measures. First, two questions in our survey are “How many relatives and close friends in the 
city do your family have?” and “How many relatives and friends do your family have in the 
local government area?” We add the responses to these two questions to measure the social 
network of a family. Second, we employ the ratio of “the amount you spend in purchasing gifts 
for your relatives or close friends at Chinese New Year” and “the money you spend on 
weddings, birthdays and funerals of your relatives or close friends”
5 to obtain the total 
expenditure on daily life.
6 We exclude occasional expenditures, such as expenditure on 
durable commodities or housing construction, to avoid measurement error. 
The rationale for the second measure is from Yan (1996) who finds that rural households in 
northern China use more than 20% of their total expenditure in exchanging gifts to maintain 
guanxi. However, this may exaggerate the cost of social networks because it does not exclude 
situations when people invest in guanxi only for short-term interests, such as finding a job, 
which could sharply increase the expenditure on gifts. Hence, it is more reasonable and 
justifiable to take into consideration only holiday or ceremony expenditure as this expenditure 
is more smooth and continuous. Further, the ratio of gift expenditure to daily expenditure in 
place of its absolute value can help mitigate the simultaneity problem in guanxi as the rich will 
have higher daily expenditure so they may spend more on gifts, and vice versa. To check for 
any potential problems with multicollinearity between the social network variables, we 
 
 
5 According to Chinese tradition, people should send gifts to relatives and friends on Chinese New Year, as well 
as on other occasions, such as weddings, birthdays, and funerals. 
6 For daily expenditure, we add the expenditures on food, cigarettes and alcohol, transportation fees, phone fees, 
utility fees, and other daily expenditure.  
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checked the covariances between them. The correlations are 0.11, 0.17, and 0.09 for the total, 
Eastern, and Middle–Western samples, respectively. This removes the possibility of severe 
multicollinearity in the regression. 
In Table 2, we provide a description of the data; first the total sample, and then after 
categorizing them into Eastern and Middle–Western regions. It is evident that the values of 
some variables vary across these regions. In terms of the dependent variable, the natural log of 
household income per capita, the mean is higher in the East than in the Middle–West: this is 
consistent with our intuition. However, the standard deviation is the reverse, meaning that 
income inequality is higher in the East than in the Middle–West. For the two guanxi variables, 
the number of “relatives and close friends in the city and local government area” in Eastern 
households is no higher than in Middle–Western households, and the lower ratio of gift 
expenditure to daily expenditure in the East indicates we have mitigated the endogeneity of the 
guanxi variables. In an effort to guarantee the exogeneity of the variable for land, we exclude 
rented land.
7 The land per capita in the East is a little higher than in the Middle–West because 
some villages in eastern provinces, such as Hebei, have a larger land endowment. As for the 
household characteristics, the number of people in the Eastern sample is much less than that in 
the Middle–Western sample. This is perhaps the result of tighter enforcement of the “one child 
policy”. In addition, the nonagricultural employment rate in the East is much higher than that 
in the Middle–West: this is because the East is generally more industrialized. More 
interestingly, the average years of education for Eastern workers is greater than for their peers 
in the Middle–Western areas. However, the converse holds for standard deviation, which 





7 Under the household responsibility system, land is distributed to households based on the number of heads. 
Farmers do not own their land but they can rent it from or to others. However, given the possibility that 
households can rent more land from or to others, we simply include the lands allocated by village. This is 






4.  Empirical Model and Regression Results 
The regression-based decomposition developed by Shorrocks (1999) comprises two steps: 
(i) setting up a regression model and estimating the coefficients; and (ii) decomposing the 
income inequality indices based on the regression estimates. First, we estimate the empirical 
model as follows: 
 
01 2 3 4 5 ij ij ij ij ij ij j n L n aS NF CO CH CP CF E y β βββββ =+ + + + + + +  
 
where LnYij denotes the natural log of the income per capita of household i in village j, SN 
is the measure of social network, FC is a set of family characteristic variables, OC denotes the 
set of physical variables—mainly land per capita, HC is the abbreviation of human 
capital—including the education and age of workers, and PC is household political capital 
(measured by membership of the Communist Party). Meanwhile, given the myriad 
uncontrollable village characteristics that may influence household income, it is reasonable to 
control for these using village dummies. We use a semilog regression as this can render the 
dependent variable closer to a normal distribution, as is common in income determination 
models. 
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation. In Model I, we exclude the guanxi variables. 
In Model II, the network measurements are included. After comparing the results of these 
models, we note that the variables that are significant in Model I are also significant in Model 
II and with the exception of party membership, their coefficients do not change substantially, 
though the R
2 increases by 0.03. 
 
[Table 3: Here]  
With respect to the social network variables, the results show the estimated coefficients are 
all significantly positive, indicating they are positively correlated with the level of household 
income. Moreover, we find that if a household has one more relative or close friend in the city 
or local government area, then household income per capita increases by 6%.
8 In addition, if 
the ratio of expenditure on gifts to daily expenditure grows by 10%, there will be a 4.5% 
increase in household income per capita.
9 These results illustrate that the influence of guanxi 
on income determination is considerable, although omitting these variables does not 
substantially bias the estimation of the remaining coefficients. However, with income 
decomposition analysis, omitted variables will exaggerate the contribution of the other 
independent variables and the error term. 
In terms of family characteristics, workers per capita play a positive role in income 
determination. The ratio of male workers is statistically significant; that is, in rural households, 
male income per worker is higher than female income per worker. The coefficient for the 
nonagricultural employment ratio is not only significant but also large: a 10% increase leads to 
an 8.8% growth in household income per capita. Per capita land has a significantly positive 
coefficient, consistent with previous research in this area (e.g., Morduch and Sicular, 2000, 
2002; Wan and Zhou, 2005). As for the human capital variables, while the coefficient of 
workers’ average age is statistically insignificant, the average education of workers exerts a 
significant inverse U-shaped influence on the level of income. With the political capital, the 
coefficient for the average party member is significantly positive in Model I but insignificant 
in Model II, perhaps because there is a correlation between political capital and the number of 




                                                 
 
8 We calculate the partial influence using  100( 1) ˆ %
b e y = − . For details, see Wooldridge (2003). 
9 Given that the return to the ratio of gift expenditure could be an inverted U-shape, we check this by adding 
its square to the regression model. The results show that the square term is not significant and therefore we 
exclude it from the final regression model.  
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variables is 0.18). Hence, the omitted variable bias in Model I indicates that the party member 
variable may actually exercise no significant influence on income as it partly represents other 
unobservable factors that could also affect household income. This argument, to some extent, 
is consistent with Li et al. (2007) who study samples of twins and find party membership has 
no significant effect on income. Moreover, the covariance between party membership and the 
ratio of gift expenditure to total daily expenditure is only 0.09, suggesting a low probability of 
increasing gift expenditure for party members. 
 
5.  Regression-Based Decomposition of Income Inequality 
In the shaping of income inequality, there are two main channels deciding the contribution 
of a certain factor to the inequality index. First, the coefficient of this variable could have a 
positive influence on the income inequality given its distribution. The greater this influence, 
the more unequal the income distribution. Second, if the returns to this variable are the same, 
its distribution decides the total income inequality index. That is, the more uneven the 
distribution of the variable, the greater its contribution to income inequality. If the distribution 
of the factor is equally distributed or its coefficient is zero, then its contribution to income 
inequality is zero. This is the core conceptualization of regression-based decomposition.
10 
Our paper employs the Shapley value decomposition framework proposed by Shorrocks 
(1999) to calculate the contribution of each variable to total income inequality. The method 
involves intensive computing requirements.
11 Suppose Y  =  f(X1, . . . , XK) is a general 
income-generation function. Usually X is different for different individuals. Replacing the real 
value of Xk with its sample mean would eliminate any differences in Xk among individuals. It is 
easy to recompute Y after this replacement. The resulting income, denoted by Yk, differs from 
 
 
10 Regression-based decomposition first appeared in Oaxaca (1973), in which he argues that gender income 
inequality is due not only to different salaries for the same position for male and female workers, but that the 
distribution of working opportunities is uneven for males and females. 
11   The World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University 




individual to individual because X, other than Xk, differ with different individuals. However, 
the differences can no longer be attributed to Xk; i.e., inequality in Yk, denoted by I(Yk), is 
brought about by variances in X except Xk. According to the most natural rule in Shorrocks 
(1999), the contribution of Xk to total inequality, Ck, can be obtained as I(Y) – I(Yk) for k = 
1, . . . , K. Shorrocks (1999) terms these contributions the “first-round effect” which is 
obtained when only one independent variable, Xk, is replaced by its sample mean. One can 
obtain a second-round Ck by replacing two variables, Xk and Xj, with their sample means in 
computing Ykj. The second-round contribution can be written as Ck = I(Yj) – I(Yjk) for k, j = 
1, . . . , K (k≠j). Similarly, the third-round contribution can be obtained as Ck = I(Yij) – I(Yijk) for 
k, j, i = 1, . . . , K (k ≠ j ≠ i). This process continues until all X are replaced by their sample 
means. In each round, it is possible to have multiple Ck that are first averaged and then 
averaged across all rounds.
12 
Because we employ a semilog model in the income determination procedure, in an attempt 
to avoid the distortion of inequality index, it is necessary to transform it back to a linear model 
to acquire the real value of Y, as follows: 
 
01 2 3 4 5 ˆˆ exp( ) exp( ) exp( ) ij ij ij ij ij ij j n a S NF CO CH CP CF E y β βββββ =• + + + + + •  
 
where   denotes the constant term, which is ruled out in the decomposition of income 
inequality because it is equal for all samples. As for the residual term, because we are unable 
to analyze its distribution, it is prudent for us to examine its contribution to total income 
inequality. Following Wan (2004), we obtain this contribution by comparing the original 
income inequality with the predicted value. The ratio of the former to the latter is the extent to 
which the variables in our regression model can explain total income inequality. Strictly 
0 ˆ exp( ) a
                                                 
 
12 A further explanation of the Shapley value is offered in Appendix I. For more details about the approach, 
refer to Shorrocks (1999). speaking, if the contribution of the residual term to total inequality is nil (i.e., the variables in 
the regression model can entirely interpret the inequality), the ratio will be 100%. Moreover, 
in an attempt to check the robustness of our results, we employ three commonly used income 
inequality indices: the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson, and the generalized entropy (GE) 
indexes.
13 Table 4 tabulates the calculated results of the explained contribution of the variables 
in the regression model in the form of a percentage for all three indices and all samples. It is 
evident that all of the income inequality measures used explain more than 50% of the variation 
in household income, especially the Gini coefficient, which explains more than 80%. 
 
[Table 4: Here] 
 
As previously discussed, the calculation of the Shapley value decomposition involves an 
enormous volume of computing power, which makes it difficult to calculate the 
decomposition process for more than about 10 explanatory variables. To simplify the 
computation, we combine variables belonging to the same category: (1) all village dummies 
with their coefficients sum to a single factor; (2) the number of family members and workers 
per capita comprise one factor; and (3) a single variable is used to represent education and its 
square in the decomposition procedure. In doing so, we can acquire the decomposition results 
with little concern for the absence of the contribution of the principal variables to income 
inequality. 
Table 5 tabulates the decomposition results based on the regression model. The left 
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right column is the ranking of this variable among all variables. Additionally, we note that the 
contribution of a given variable may vary across the different income inequality indices. This 
is because different indices are associated with different social welfare functions that assume 
different aversions to inequality. In addition, they place different weights on different 
segments of the underlying Lorenz curve. Therefore, different indices of inequality often 
produce different measurement results, and these may carry over to the inequality 
decomposition. Nevertheless, the top five variables are identical for each index and their 
ranking is unchanged, suggesting that the contribution of these variables to income inequality 
is rather robust. Though the ranking of the other five variables are inconsistent across the 
inequality indices, they are the same for the last two indices. Allowing that the contribution of 
the final four variables is considerably smaller than the first five factors, it is no exaggeration 
to draw the conclusion that our decomposition is rather robust and convincing. 
 
[Table 5: Here] 
 
To begin, the results shows the aggregate contribution of the two network variables are 
more than 12%, even up to 13.4% for the Gini coefficient, suggesting inequality in guanxi 
actually exerts a significant effect in the shaping of income inequality. More specifically, the 
number of relatives and close friends in the city or local government area contribute more than 
9% across the three inequality indices, higher than any other variable ranking below fifth. 
Additionally, another guanxi variable—the ratio of gift expenditure to total daily 
expenditure—contributes more than 2% to the Atkinson index and GE0, and up to 3.8% to the 
Gini coefficient. 
In light of the great differences in the contribution to income inequality across the guanxi 
variables, it is necessary and even interesting to analyze the possible reasons. We have already 
discussed that there are mainly two reasons determining the contribution of a certain factor to  
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income inequality: the coefficient and the distribution of the variable. That is, the bigger the 
coefficient, the greater the contribution and the more uneven the distribution, the more 
significant the contribution. Hence, we deduce that the main reason for the great contribution 
of the number of relatives or close friends in the city or local government area lies in its highly 
uneven distribution, because the estimated coefficient is only 0.057 while its standard 
deviation is as high as 3.08 (bearing in mind the mean value is only 2.21). On the other hand, 
the other guanxi variable—the ratio of gift expenditure to total daily expenditure—contributes 
to inequality largely because of its great influence over income determination, whereas its 
distribution is relatively equal when compared with its mean value. These two contrasting 
scenarios are interesting when allowing for the following possibilities. The distribution of the 
former variable is quite exogenous for rural households. For the ratio of gift expenditure, 
however, households can invest more on their guanxi as long as they realize the profits of their 
investment. Thus, its relatively smaller contribution is most probably due to the equal 
distribution of this variable, even though the coefficient is rather large. 
The village dummies rank first across all factors contributing to income inequality in all 
indices, consistent with our intuition that there are myriad of unobservable disparities between 
villages in China that will unquestionably influence household income, including location, 
natural endowment and infrastructure. This finding is consistent with the previous literature. 
The contribution of the space factor in overall income inequality in China has been 
emphasized by most previous studies, including Wan (2004), Gustafsson et al. (2008), and 
Yue et al. (2008). Moreover, some recent studies on Chinese regional income disparities pay 
attention to economic variance at the lower regional level (counties, townships, and villages). 
For example, Morduch and Sicular (2002) illustrated the importance of the location factor 
among different counties in the same region. Using a village survey conducted in the Handan 
district, Knight and Li (1997) found a ‘cumulative causation’ that resulted in economic 
disparities among villages in the same district. Likewise, Perkins (2003) employed filed  
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research and data collection in suburban Tianjin to demonstrate that large economic variations 
existed among villages in the same township, including substantial differences in economic 
structure and the level of well-being. Sato (2003), based on field research, proposed a typology 
of  villages and examined the relationship between village characteristics and peasant income. 
Using data on 961 villages distributed across 22 provinces, Sato (2008) also demonstrated that 
village-specific socioeconomic factors, including social, physical and human capital, strongly 
influenced household income. 
As for the nonagricultural employment rate, it ranks second in all inequality indices and its 
contribution is more than 20%. This is quite appreciable given that the returns in 
nonagricultural occupations are higher than in agricultural work, especially in those areas with 
barren land or a lack of natural endowments. The contribution of the education factor is 
surprisingly high, ranking third across all indices with a higher than 18% contribution. This 
partly accords with Morduch and Sicular (2002), where they find that education contributes 
more than 16.9% to the Gini coefficient of total income inequality in rural China. For this 
reason, our results once again prove the significance of education in rural China and provide 
evidence for the justification of compulsory education to narrow income inequality. 
The ratio of male workers in the work force is also quite important, ranking fifth across all 
indices with a contribution greater than 5%, suggesting that there is still great income 
unevenness between male and female workers in rural households. For the combined variable 
of the number of people and workers per capita, they are only positive in the Gini coefficient 
but negative elsewhere, and this probably arises from the convergence in family size and 
workers per capita brought about by the strict “one child policy”. Wan (2004) also finds that 
the disparity in the number of people and worker ratio is narrowing in rural China. 
The contribution of land per capita is rather small across all three indices, less than 1%, 
and even negative in the Atkinson index, suggesting land only partially narrows income 
inequality in rural Chinese households. This is also consistent with the high contribution of the  
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nonagricultural employment ratio to income inequality, as families with less land would 
choose to work outside in nonagricultural occupations that will actually compensate for the 
loss of land, and thus bridge the gap between themselves and people with more land. 
Additionally, with the adoption of the household responsibility system in rural China, all lands 
are allocated per capita, and this can also explain the low contribution of inequality in land to 
income inequality. 
The role of party membership is rather trivial in our results with a contribution of less than 
0.6% to each index. This finding is consistent with Morduch and Sicular (2002), who find that 
the number of party members has little influence on income inequality (for example, only 
0.42% to the Gini coefficient). The average age of the workforce, used to estimate the 
sophistication of workers, is also weak. This suggests that while the increase in age would 
probably imply greater experience, it also decreases the physical condition for rural 
households. 
 
6.  A Cross-Regional Comparison of the Role of Guanxi 
In this section, we test how the contribution of guanxi to income inequality varies across 
areas at different stages of development by grouping the data into Eastern and 
Middle–Western areas by the level of marketization. We define Eastern areas as those with a 
level of marketizaton above 6.0, including Hebei, Liaoning, Beijing, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan, all of which have benefited from their location and 
policy priorities in the process of reform and opening-up. The remaining data are categorized 
as Middle–Western, including Henan, Hubei, Guangxi, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, 
Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Hunan, Jilin, Ningxia, and Heilongjiang. Among these, all marketization 
indices are less than 6.0, except for 6.03 in Sichuan. However, allowing for the fact that 
Sichuan has a large ratio of agricultural workers and geographically belongs to the Western 
area, we still categorize it as a Middle–Western area.  
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(1) The income determination model and regression result 
The income determination model is identical with the former one and we acquire the 
regression result in Table 6.
14 
 
[Table 6: Here] 
 
The coefficients for both guanxi variables are higher in the East than the Middle–West. An 
increase in one relative or close friend in the city or local government area could bring about as 
much as 6.5% growth in income per capita in Eastern areas, but only 5.3% in Middle–Western 
areas. Likewise, a 10% increase in the ratio of gift expenditure to total daily expenditure 
causes per capita income to rise by 8.9% for households in the East and only 3.1% for their 
peers in the Middle–West. These findings are consistent with Lin’s (2001) argument for a 
‘return deficit’: that is, one source of social capital inequality is that a given quality or quantity 
of social capital brings about differential returns for different individuals or groups. 
(2) The inequality decomposition results 
The disparity in returns to guanxi across different areas is not enough to judge how its 
contribution to income inequality changes at different stages of development. Hence, we 
decompose income inequality using the regression model and rank the contribution of all 
factors for both areas, as tabulated in Table 7. 
 
[Table 7: Here] 
 
As shown, though the contribution of each factor varies across the inequality indices, the 
 
 
14 To test the necessity for grouping, we conduct an F-test of the Eastern and Middle–Western areas; the 
results show there is a systematic difference between these groups. The appendix includes details.  
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top five factors are identical and their rankings remain unchanged. In addition, despite the fact 
that the rankings of the final four variables change across the three indices, it is safe to say the 
decomposition results are robust and persuasive as the contribution of the final four factors is 
quite small when compared with the top five factors. However, the total contribution of the 
guanxi variables remains fourth in each index for both categories of data; their contribution in 
Eastern areas amounts to 17.8%, substantially more than the 12.9% in the Middle–Western 
areas. Likewise, for the Atkinson index and GE0, the gap in the total contribution of guanxi 
between the East and Middle–West is large, some 3.9% and 5.1%, respectively. 
The contribution of relatives or friends in a city or local government area in the East is a 
little smaller than in the Middle–West. This is mostly because the distribution of this factor is 
much more uneven in Middle–Western households: the standard deviation in Middle–Western 
households is 3.34 and only 2.67 in Eastern households. While the coefficient is larger for 
Eastern households, this does not mitigate the effects of the uneven distribution of relatives or 
friends in Middle–Western areas. Nevertheless, this does not mean the role of relatives or 
friends in shaping income inequality in more developed areas is less significant than in less 
developed areas. In fact, it is the reverse. We should not neglect the possibility that with further 
economic development and marketization, the contribution of relatives or close friends in a 
city or local government area could be higher with a larger coefficient; i.e., more considerable 
benefits. 
The contribution of the guanxi variable—the ratio of gift expenditure to total daily 
expenditure—for Eastern households is as high as 8.1%, much greater than the contribution of 
only 2.7% in Middle–Western families. This is most likely because the coefficient for this 
variable is much greater in the East, as the distribution of this factor is relatively equal with a 
low standard deviation. We conjecture the main reason for this result lies in that guanxi could 
bring about benefits in the form of sharing information or mutual help in Eastern areas where 
there are greater economic opportunities.  
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The village dummies unsurprisingly remain the factor that contributes most to income 
inequality. We know household income inequality can be divided into two parts: inequality 
between villages and inequality within villages. The contribution of the village dummies 
indicating the inequality between villages is much higher in Middle–Western areas, suggesting 
the disparities between villages are much smaller in the East. The contribution of 
nonagricultural employment is more significant for Middle–Western households, up to 23.7% 
higher than the 18.4% for Eastern households. The main reason for this, as shown in Table 2, is 
that the coefficient for Middle–Western households is much higher as the standard deviation is 
not very different between the two areas. 
The contribution of education to income inequality is not only much higher in the East, but 
rises faster in its ranking, especially for the Atkinson index and GE0, where it jumps to the 
number-one factor. Combined with Table 2 and Table 6, we can deduce that it is because the 
coefficient of education for Eastern workers is much higher than for their counterparts in the 
Middle–West, as the standard deviation is much lower in the East than in the Middle–West. 
This suggests the consequences of education are more striking with economic development, 
even for the rural households who are traditionally a group with lower returns to education. 
An interesting finding is the contribution of the ratio of party members, which is negative 
in Middle–Western areas but positive in Eastern areas. We argue that party membership stands 
for political capital, which can only bring about benefits when there are economic resources in 
the village. Therefore, for villages in Middle–Western areas, it is not only that there are fewer 
economic resources, but also because party members should spend their personal time on 
village affairs or not working outside the village, both of which could handicap income growth. 
In Eastern villages, however, there are more economic resources or even rents that will make it 
easier for party members to acquire access to income, leading to considerable returns to their 
political capital. 
The ratio of male workers contributes more in Middle–Western areas than in Eastern areas  
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because it is more unevenly distributed in the former, as indicated in Table 2, though the return 
is lower. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
Our paper quantifies the contribution of guanxi or social networks to income inequality in 
rural China and shows how this contribution varies among areas at different stages of 
development and marketization. Our main findings are as follows. 
(1) For rural households, Guanxi can significantly improve their household income, and 
inequality in its distribution will contribute to total income inequality as much as 
12.1%–13.4%, ranking fourth behind village dummy variables, nonagricultural employment, 
and education. Hence, it is reasonable for us to defend social capital as perhaps not simply ‘the 
capital of the poor’, since at least social networks, the foremost category of social capital, 
widens the income gap between the poor and rich. 
(2) Guanxi, as an informal institution, receives more benefits and is much more important 
in the shaping of income inequality for households in areas with greater development and level 
of marketization. 
Because the data we employ in this paper are collected from rural China, we are not sure 
whether the same conclusion could still be drawn in Chinese cities. Moreover, guanxi in our 
paper mostly refers to ‘strong ties’,
15 so whether the results still hold for ‘weak ties’ remains 
unknown. Whether or not weak ties that are important in developed countries are also 
significant in contemporary Chinese society deserves further study. The more tantalizing 
question is whether the fact that guanxi are more important to households in Eastern areas will 
change if formal institutions develop, and if they will become increasingly mature in the future. 
These questions represent the scope of our future study. 
 
 




                                                
Comprehending the evolution of the social network function could provide a better 
understanding of the trends and formation of future reforms. It will determine whether China 
will build a fully-fledged free-market economic system or a market embedded with nonmarket 
forces.
16 The undeniable reality is, however, that family-based guanxi is unevenly distributed, 
which could engender that ‘not all men are created equal’. If there is nothing we can do about 
this inherited inequality, we should take measures to avoid it evolving into a further 
disadvantage for people later in their lives. After all, most of us are more willing to live in a 
society with equal opportunities, transparent regulations, and fair competition. Thus, how 
nonmarket forces evolve in the ongoing transformation and economic development of China 
is a topic deserving of further study. 
 
 
16 Stiglitz (2000) holds the view that the successful development of the Chinese economy in the past is 
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In an effort to test the necessity of grouping our data into Eastern areas and 
Middle–Western areas, we use an F-test for these groups. 
First, we construct a restricted model; i.e., simply including the area dummy and other 
income determination variables. The model follows: 
12 03 4 5 6 ij ij ij ij ij ij j n Ln a AR SN FC OC HC PC FE u y β ββββββ =+ + + + + + + +  
where  AR is the dummy variable and takes a value of 1 for Eastern areas and 0 for 
Middle–Western areas. Then we acquire the SSRr, which is about 493.3. We then construct the 
unrestricted model, meaning that there is an extra interaction term between area and the other 
variables, as follows: 
12 3 4 5 7 0 6 * ij ij ij ij ij ij j n Ln a AR SN AR Var FC OC HC PC FE u y β ββ βββββ = + ++ +++++ + w
here Var includes SN, FC, OC, HC and PC, and AR*Var denotes the interaction term between 
area and the other variables. The SSRur in this model is about 484.1. 












whereqis the incremental number of variables involved in moving from the restricted model 
to the unrestricted model (11 here) and  1 nk − −  is the degrees of freedom of the unrestricted 
model (856). We then calculate the F-statistic, which is about 1.64, suggesting there is a 





Figure 1: Sample Distribution and Marketization Level by Province in China 
 
 
Notes: [1] Our sample includes 22 provinces with parentheses below. 
[2] In each parenthesis following the name of a province, the first figure is the 
number of villages, the second is the number of households, and the third is the 
marketization level. 
[3] Darker shading reflects higher levels of marketization. The classification used 






Table 1: Variable Explanation 






the number of relatives and close friends in city 
or local government 









the number of family members 
workers per capita 
the ratio of male workers 
the ratio of nonagricultural workers 
OC 
(physical capital) 






the average age of workers 
the average years of education of workers 
the square of average education 
PC 
(political capital) 
partmave  the ratio of party members 
FE 
(fixed effect) 
FE  village dummy variables 
Dependent 
variable 
lny  the logarithm of income per capita Table 2: The Statistical Description of Variables 






N = 927 
Mean    S.E. 
Middle–Western 
N = 567 
Mean    S.E. 
Eastern 
N = 360 

































































PC partmave  0.06 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.15
Dependent
Variable
Ln y  7.86 1.06 7.61 0.99 8.26 1.46
 
 
33 Table 3: The Regression Results for the Total Sample 














































OC landpercap  0.029





















PC partmave  0.363
* 0.192  0.155 0.190 
Constant  0 a   6.315
*** 0.286 6.159
*** 0.286 
FE village  dummies  YES 
Adjusted R
2   0.47 0.50 
No. of Obs.    927 927 
Notes: [1] Model (1) and (2) are all regressed on village dummies, whose coefficients 
and standard errors are omitted. 
 [2] *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * 






Table 4: The Percentage of Explained Income Inequality 










0.55 0.44  80% 




GE0 0.58  0.33  57% 
Gini 
coefficient 
0.48 0.40  83% 




GE0 0.49  0.27  55% 
Gini 
coefficient 
0.57 0.43  75% 




GE0 0.60  0.31  52%  
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Table 5: The Decomposition Results for the Total Sample 
Contribution (%)  Ranking  Variables 
Gini Atkinson  GE0 Gini  Atkinson  GE0 
village 
dummies 
38.5  43.2  42.9  1 1 1 
ratnonaw 20.5  22.5  22.9  2 2 2 













4 4  4 
ratmale  5.8  5.2 5.3  5 5 5 
numbpeop and 
workerave 
1.8  –1.3  –1.7  6 9 9 
landpercap  0.8  –0.7  –0.8  7 8 8 
partmave  0.6  0.6 0.6  8 6 6 
worage  0.2  0.2 0.2  9 7 7 
Total  100  100 100       
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Table 6: The Regression Results after Grouping 



















































OC landpercap  0.033





















PC  partmave  –0.18 0.245  0.397 0.304 
Constant cons  6.794
*** 0.333 5.02
*** 0.404 
FE village  dummies  Yes 
Adjusted R
2   0.45 0.48 
No. of Obs.    360 567 
Notes: [1] Models (1) and (2) are all regressed on the village dummies, whose 
coefficients 
and standard errors are omitted. 
[2] *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and 
* at the 10 percent level. 
 Table 7: The Decomposition Results after Grouping 
Contribution (%)  Ranking 
Gini Atkinson  GE0 Gini  Atkinson  GE0 
Variables 
M–E  E  M–E E M–E E M–E E  M–E E  M–E E 
village  dummies  37.5  26.4  40.4 28.0 40.1 28.0  1  1  1  2  1  2 
ratnonaw  23.7  18.4  26.1 21.2 26.4 21.7  2  3  2  3  2  3 






















4  4 3  4 3  4 
ratmale  7.5  5.5  7.5 5.4 7.7 5.6  5  5  5 5  5  5 
numbpeop and 
workerave 
2.9  4.5  1.2 0.03 1.1 –0.8  6  6  6  7  6  8 
landpercap  1.2  0.2  –0.05  –2.0  –0.2  –2.3  7  8 8  9 9  9 
partmave  –0.04  1.6  –0.09  1.3  –0.09  1.4 9  7 9  6 8  6 
worage  0.8  –0.02  0.7 –0.34 0.7 –0.38  8  9  7  8  7  7 
Total  100  100  100 100 100 100         
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